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403 
Winning the Waiting Game: How Oklahoma Can Rectify 
the Discrepancy Between Its No-Impeachment Rule and 
Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado 
Juror 8: “It’s always difficult to keep personal prejudice out of a 
thing like this. And whenever you run into it, prejudice always 
obscures the truth.”1 
I. Introduction 
For most people, the jury room remains a mystery. What is known: 
twelve semi-randomly chosen jurors enter the jury room, discuss the merits 
and arguments of a case, decide the fate of each party, and leave the room 
to have their decision announced publicly.2 What is generally not known, 
however, is the deliberation leading to that decision. What happens within 
the physical walls of the jury room varies in each case because the inputs—
such as the jurors and the facts—are different in each case.3  
Even more arcane are the inner workings within the mind of each juror. 
While each juror must decide the case according to the evidence established 
in the record, it is nearly impossible to keep personal feelings or proclivities 
from creeping in. For that reason, society and the law do not require jurors 
to be robotic arbiters4—devoid of emotions or predilections. But, according 
to the Sixth Amendment, criminal defendants have the right to a fair and 
impartial trial.5 Consequently, at what point does a juror’s reasoning, or 
basis of reasoning, infringe upon a criminal defendant’s constitutional 
right? 
Imagine the following scenario: A Native American defendant, in 
Oklahoma, is charged with criminal assault stemming from a barroom 
brawl. The prosecution has admitted credible evidence that the defendant 
consumed alcohol on the night in question, but the amount or extent of 
alcohol consumed is unclear. Moreover, the issue in the case turns on 
                                                                                                                 
 1. 12 ANGRY MEN (MGM Studios 1957). 
 2. See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 3 (1966). 
 3. See id. at 464 (recognizing “that no two juries, and for that matter no two judges, are 
alike” while trying to determine whether one can “connect the background characteristics of 
juries and judges with their decisions”). 
 4. See McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 553 (1984) 
(explaining that the Sixth Amendment requires “a fair trial but not a perfect one, for there 
are no perfect trials”). 
 5. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  
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whether the defendant instigated the fight or merely responded in self-
defense. After a two-day trial, the defendant is found guilty. 
Several days after the trial, a juror approaches the public defender tasked 
with representing the defendant and explains that she is having second 
thoughts about the verdict. She also mentions that Juror No. 3 dominated 
the deliberations and expressed racially charged statements about the 
defendant. More specifically, Juror No. 3 said he lived in a community with 
a large population of Native Americans and insisted that “when Indians get 
alcohol, they all get drunk, and when they get drunk, they get violent”; 
therefore, the defendant must have started the fight. Despite initial 
reservations from some jurors, Juror No. 3 managed to persuade the few 
remaining holdouts to convict the defendant.  
The public defender, aghast by this revelation, does not believe his client 
received a fair and impartial trial and thereafter begins drafting a motion for 
a new trial. Unfortunately, after the public defender consults Oklahoma’s 
evidence code, he realizes that Oklahoma law prohibits jurors from 
testifying about what transpires in the jury room in order to impeach the 
verdict, except in a few, unrelated circumstances involving extraneous 
influences. 
A public defender in that hypothetical,6 burdened with a seemingly 
endless caseload, might stop there and decide against filing a motion for a 
new trial because the evidence rules provide no remedy. And until 2017, an 
attorney in such a case was right: there was no remedy. But, in Peña-
Rodriguez v. Colorado, the United States Supreme Court held that the Sixth 
Amendment requires that a juror be able to testify as to another juror’s 
overt statements of racial bias or animus if those statements were a 
significant factor in reaching the verdict.7 Because Peña-Rodriguez was 
based on the Sixth Amendment, Oklahoma’s evidence rule, Rule 2606(B),8 
which mirrors the language of the federal rule barring juror testimony, was 
also deemed unconstitutional when applied to cases involving displays of 
                                                                                                                 
 6. The preceding hypothetical was largely, but loosely, based on United States v. 
Benally, 546 F.3d 1230 (10th Cir. 2008), abrogated by Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. 
Ct. 855 (2017). In Benally, the facts were different—e.g., the case was in federal court 
because the defendant had allegedly assaulted a Bureau of Indian Affairs officer—but the 
juror’s statements are mostly recited verbatim. See id. at 1231–32. In that case, the Tenth 
Circuit held that a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right was not violated when jurors 
expressed racial bias during deliberations and that evidence of the racial bias was precluded 
by Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b). See id. at 1241. Contra Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 
869. 
 7. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869. 
 8. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2606(B) (2011).  
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overt racism in the jury room. Unfortunately, however, neither Rule 
2606(B) nor Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 606(b) has been updated to 
reflect this significant change in the law—perpetuating a waiting game. 
This Comment highlights the conflict between the newly created racial-
bias exception and Rule 2606(B), as well as FRE 606(b), and provides 
Oklahoma’s lawmakers with recommendations for rectifying that 
discrepancy. By adopting these recommendations, Oklahoma can set an 
example for other jurisdictions to follow and, in the process, win the 
waiting game. Part II explores the historical treatment of the no-
impeachment rule, beginning with the English common law and 
culminating in its codification into the Federal Rules of Evidence, which 
Oklahoma adopted. Part III reviews the two prominent U.S. Supreme Court 
cases interpreting FRE 606(b)—prior to Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado—that 
rejected constitutional challenges to the rule. Part IV examines the ground-
breaking Peña-Rodriguez decision and the newly created exception to the 
no-impeachment rule. Part V discusses the immediate and long-term effects 
of Peña-Rodriguez and explains the reasons for the reluctance of the 
Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence (Advisory Committee) to 
amend FRE 606(b). Finally, Part VI provides Oklahoma lawmakers with 
alternative amendments to rectify the unconstitutionality of Rule 2606(b). 
II. The Law Before Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado 
A. The Common Law Development of the No-Impeachment Rule 
Traditionally, the jury deliberation room has been considered a black 
box9 because, in theory, “no one should be a witness to his own 
misconduct.”10 The treatment of jury deliberations and the protection of 
verdicts from juror impeachment in America traces its lineage back to the 
English common law. Before the case of Vaise v. Delaval,11 English courts 
admitted juror testimony to invalidate verdicts if the testimony contained 
evidence of juror misconduct.12 In 1785, however, Lord Mansfield upheld 
                                                                                                                 
 9. See Amanda R. Wolin, What Happens in the Jury Room Stays in the Jury Room . . . 
but Should It?: A Conflict Between the Sixth Amendment and Federal Rule of Evidence 
606(b), 60 UCLA L. REV. 262, 289 (2012) (“The jury room is meant to be a black box, and 
what happens in the jury room is meant to stay there.”). 
 10. Comment, Impeachment of Jury Verdicts, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 360, 360 (1958); see 
Note, Evidence: Impeachment of Verdict When Jurors Obtain Independent Information, 10 
DUKE L.J. 149, 149–50 (1961). 
 11. 1 T.R. 11, 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (K.B. 1785); see Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 863. 
 12. See Benjamin T. Huebner, Note, Beyond Tanner: An Alternative Framework for 
Postverdict Juror Testimony, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1469, 1472 (2006). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020
406 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:403 
 
 
the Vaise verdict notwithstanding the evidence that the jurors reached their 
verdict by chance.13 Lord Mansfield’s opinion—in its entirety—held that: 
The Court cannot receive such an affidavit from any of the 
jurymen themselves, in all of whom such conduct is a very high 
misdemeanor: but in every such case the Court must derive their 
knowledge from some other source: such as from some person 
having seen the transaction through a window, or by some such 
other means.14 
Thus, the Mansfield rule, as it became known, broadly prohibited juror 
testimony.15 More colloquially, the Mansfield rule provided that “a juror 
cannot impeach his own verdict,”16 and the policy behind this rule 
highlighted the inherent untrustworthiness in a juror testifying about his 
own misconduct.17 Because of Lord Mansfield’s influence on early 
jurisprudence, the Mansfield rule gained notoriety and broad 
implementation throughout both England and the American colonies.18  
Despite the Mansfield rule’s broad acceptance, it never received 
universal adherence, especially in America.19 For example, in the 1852 case 
of United States v. Reid, the U.S. Supreme Court cautioned that “cases 
might arise in which it would be impossible to refuse [juror testimony] 
without violating the plainest principles of justice.”20 The Court, however, 
ultimately applied the no-impeachment rule and excluded juror affidavits 
testifying that a juror received and read an outside newspaper.21 But the 
primary divergence from the Mansfield rule came from Iowa in 1866.22  
                                                                                                                 
 13. In other words, “the jury broke their deadlock by ‘toss[ing] up’ (i.e., by casting 
lots).” Id. (alterations in original); see Susan Crump, Jury Misconduct, Jury Interviews, and 
the Federal Rules of Evidence: Is the Broad Exclusionary Principle of Rule 606(b) 
Justified?, 66 N.C. L. REV. 509, 513 (1988). 
 14. John L. Rosshirt, Note, Evidence—Admissibility of Jurors’ Affidavits to Impeach 
Jury Verdict, 31 NOTRE DAME LAW. 484, 484 (1956) (quoting Vaise, 1 T.R. 11, 99 Eng. Rep. 
944) (emphasis added). 
 15. See Huebner, supra note 12, at 1472–73; see also Jack Pope, The Mental Operations 
of Jurors, 40 TEX. L. REV. 849, 849 (1962) (noting that Lord Mansfield created the rule in 
the eighteenth century that prohibited jurors for testifying about their own misconduct). 
 16. See, e.g., Rosshirt, supra note 14, at 484; Comment, supra note 10, at 361. 
 17. See Crump, supra note 13, at 513. 
 18. See B.M.K., Note, Jurors—Impeachment of Verdict, 64 U. PA. L. REV. 86, 86 
(1915). 
 19. See Huebner, supra note 12, at 1473; Crump, supra note 13, at 514–15. 
 20. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 361, 366 (1851). 
 21. Id. at 367. 
 22. See Huebner, supra note 12, at 1473. 
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In Wright v. Illinois & Mississippi Telegraph Co., the Iowa Supreme 
Court explicitly rejected the Mansfield rule23 and adopted what became 
known as the “Iowa rule.”24 This new rule permitted courts to receive juror 
affidavits “to show any matter occurring during the trial or in the jury room, 
which does not essentially inhere in the verdict itself[.]”25 In effect, the 
Iowa rule allowed jurors to testify about objective facts that occurred in the 
jury room because, the Iowa Supreme Court reasoned, other jurors could 
easily dispute or corroborate the juror’s testimony.26 Inversely, the Iowa 
rule prohibited jurors from testifying about “subjective facts such as the 
effect of overt acts upon a juror’s thinking.”27 As a result, a minority of 
states followed suit, adopting the Iowa rule.28 
Thereafter, the Mansfield rule and the Iowa rule competed in American 
common law.29 The U.S. Supreme Court applied the Iowa rule twice30 but 
ultimately decided against adopting the Iowa rule at the federal level in 
McDonald v. Pless.31 In doing so, however, the Court again expressed its 
foreshadowing refrain from Reid—this time, that a juror’s own testimony 
may be necessary “in the gravest and most important cases.”32 Despite this 
ambiguous forewarning, the Court recognized the no-impeachment rule as 
the law of the land, and the McDonald holding, known over time as “the 
federal rule,” prevailed throughout the twentieth century.33 
                                                                                                                 
 23. See 20 Iowa 195, 211–13 (1866). 
 24. See Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 863 (2017). 
 25. Wright, 20 Iowa at 210. 
 26. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 863. 
 27. Note, Impeachment of Verdicts by Jurors—Rule of Evidence 606(b), 4 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 417, 420 (1978). 
 28. See Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 865 (noting, as of 2017, nine states have adopted 
the Iowa rule); see also Huebner, supra note 12, at 1474 (commenting that the Iowa rule 
“gained broad acceptance” but only supporting this claim by stating that “[a]t least twelve 
states adopted the rule”). 
 29. See Crump, supra note 13, at 517–20. 
 30. See, e.g., Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 382–84 (1912); Mattox v. United 
States, 146 U.S. 140, 151 (1892). 
 31. 238 U.S. 264, 269 (1915); see Warger v. Shauers, 574 U.S. 40, 46–47 (2014) (“This 
Court occasionally employed language that might have suggested a preference for the Iowa 
rule. But to the extent that these decisions created any question as to which approach this 
Court followed, McDonald v. Pless largely settled matters. There, we held that juror 
affidavits were not admissible to show that jurors had entered a ‘quotient’ verdict, precisely 
the opposite of the result reached by the Iowa Supreme Court in its decision establishing the 
Iowa approach.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 32. McDonald, 238 U.S. at 269; see supra text accompanying note 20. 
 33. See Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 876 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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B. FRE 606(b)—The Codification of the No-Impeachment Rule 
During the first half of the twentieth century, several organizations 
attempted to codify common-law evidence rules, but no effort was 
successful34 until the Advisory Committee was appointed.35 After the 
Advisory Committee was formed to develop what ultimately became the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, the Committee had to decide whether to codify 
the federal no-impeachment rule or the Iowa rule. The Advisory 
Committee’s first draft favored a more liberal rule, comparable to the Iowa 
rule;36 however, the Committee ultimately scrapped that approach. The 
proposed rule, which the Advisory Committee sent to Congress for 
confirmation, reflected the McDonald approach.37 The debate over the 
proper standard did not end there. The U.S. House of Representatives 
passed a bill incorporating the Iowa rule into the federal evidence code,38 
but the U.S. Senate declined to adopt that version39 and instead instituted 
FRE 606(b), mirroring the federal rule.40 
Currently, FRE 606(b) prohibits the use of juror testimony to impeach a 
verdict, specifically foreclosing testimony about the inner workings and 
deliberations inside the jury room, except in three narrow instances. Under 
the rule, jurors may testify when:  
                                                                                                                 
 34. See Michael S. Ariens, The Law of Evidence and the Idea of Progress, 25 LOY. L.A. 
L. REV. 853, 858–63 (1992) (discussing early codification efforts by, namely, the American 
Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws). 
 35. Id. at 863–64. 
 36. See Crump, supra note 13, at 520; see also Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 864. 
 37. Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 265 
(1972); see Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 864; see also Crump, supra note 13, at 520–21 
(“The Advisory Committee’s final proposal, which eventually was adopted by the Supreme 
Court, added the restriction, taken from Mattox and Woodward, that jurors were not 
competent to testify about any occurrences or statements made during deliberations . . . .”) 
(internal citations omitted). 
 38. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, H.R. REP. NO. 93-
650, at 9–10 (1973), reprinted in 28 U.S.C.S. FED. R. EVID. App. 1, at 167–68 (Law. Co-op. 
1975); see Crump, supra note 13, at 521; see also FED. R. EVID. 606 advisory committee’s 
note to subdivision (b). 
 39. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, S. REP. NO. 93-
1277, at 56 (1974), reprinted in 28 U.S.C.S. FED. R. EVID. App. 2, at 203–04 (Law. Co-op. 
1975); see Crump, supra note 13, at 521; see also FED. R. EVID. 606 advisory committee’s 
note to subdivision (b).  
 40. See Wolin, supra note 9, at 271–72; see also id. at 271 n.37 (discussing the 2006 
amendment, which created an exception in cases where a mistake was made on the verdict 
form, as well the 2011 amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence, which restyled the rule 
to make them more legible and accessible). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol72/iss2/6
2020]       COMMENTS 409 
 
 
(A) extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought 
to the jury’s attention;  
(B) an outside influence was improperly brought to bear on any 
juror; or  
(C) a mistake was made in entering the verdict on the verdict 
form.41 
Like many states, Oklahoma’s comparable Rule 2606(B)42 is a near word-
for-word copy of FRE 606(b), and its adoption of the rule in 2002 did not 
significantly change the state’s common-law treatment of juror testimony.43 
                                                                                                                 
 41. FED. R. EVID. 606(b). In its entirety, FRE 606(b) reads as follows: 
(b) During an Inquiry into the Validity of a Verdict or Indictment. 
(1) Prohibited Testimony or Other Evidence. During an inquiry into the 
validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify about any 
statement made or incident that occurred during the jury's deliberations; the 
effect of anything on that juror's or another juror's vote; or any juror's 
mental processes concerning the verdict or indictment. The court may not 
receive a juror's affidavit or evidence of a juror's statement on these matters. 
(2) Exceptions. A juror may testify about whether: 
(A) extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the 
jury's attention; 
(B) an outside influence was improperly brought to bear on any juror; or 
(C) a mistake was made in entering the verdict on the verdict form. 
Id. 
 42. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2606(B) (2011). In its entirety, section 2606(B) reads as follows: 
B. Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror shall not 
testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's 
deliberations or as to the effect of anything upon the juror's mind or another 
juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the 
verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's mental processes during 
deliberations. A juror may testify on the question whether extraneous 
prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or 
whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. 
An affidavit or evidence of any statement by the juror concerning a matter 
about which the juror would be precluded from testifying shall not be received 
for these purposes. 
Id. In 2006, FRE 606(b) added a third exception for mistakes on verdict forms, which 
Oklahoma has not adopted. See FED. R. EVID. 606 advisory committee’s note on the 2006 
amendment to amended rule 606(b); cf. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2606(B). 
 43. See 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2606(B) Evidence Subcommittee’s Note (“As to § 606(B) 
relating to inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, does not change Oklahoma law 
significantly.”). 
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Therefore, in Oklahoma, trial courts exclude juror testimony if it does not 
fit one of the narrow exceptions.44 
III. Supreme Court Interpretation of FRE 606(b) 
Since the codification of the no-impeachment rule, the Supreme Court 
has rarely had to interpret FRE 606(b). The two cases in which the Court 
interpreted and applied FRE 606(b), prior to Peña-Rodriguez, are Tanner v. 
United States and Warger v. Shauers.45 In each case, the U.S. Supreme 
Court upheld a broad application of the no-impeachment rule and failed to 
find additional exceptions to the rule. 
A. Tanner v. United States  
1. Background 
In Tanner,46 defendants Anthony Tanner and William Conover were 
each found guilty on one count of defrauding the United States and various 
counts of mail fraud.47 The defendants’ charges arose out of shady 
contractual dealings involving the construction of a coal-fired power plant 
and an accompanying patrol road by Seminole Electric Cooperative, Inc.48 
Because both projects were backed by a federal loan, criminal charges were 
brought in federal court.49 After a hung jury in an initial trial, a subsequent 
trial with a different jury found both defendants guilty.50 
2. Post-Trial Motions 
After the trial but before the defendants were sentenced, one of the 
jurors, on her own, called Tanner’s attorney to inform him that multiple 
jurors had consumed alcohol during recesses and had slept through portions 
                                                                                                                 
 44. Given Rule 2606(B)’s broad prohibition, Oklahoma courts have rarely addressed the 
effect of a juror’s racial bias in relation to post-verdict inquiries. But in 2012, the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court held that a juror’s racial bias was unconstitutional; however, the court 
qualified its holding under the extremely narrow facts of that case. See Fields v. Saunders, 
2012 OK 17, ¶¶ 12–15, 278 P.3d 577, 581–82. Despite the holding, the court “stress[ed] that 
this is a fact specific case of juror bias and not a case of a juror impeaching a verdict”—thus 
distinguishing the case from one involving Rule 2606(B). Id. ¶ 13, 278 P.3d at 581.  
 45. See Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 866 (2017) (“[S]ince the 
enactment of Rule 606(b), the Court has addressed the precise question whether the 
Constitution mandates [a racial bias] exception to it in just two instances.”). 
 46. 483 U.S. 107 (1987). 
 47. Id. at 112–13. 
 48. See id. at 110–13. 
 49. Id. at 112. 
 50. Id. at 112–13. 
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of the trial.51 Tanner’s attorney filed several motions, including one for a 
new trial, but the district court judge found the juror testimony 
“inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) to impeach the jury's 
verdict.”52 Instead, the judge invited additional evidence—not in the form 
of juror testimony—to determine whether a new trial should be granted.53 
Upon review, the judge again ruled that the testimony was inadmissible, so 
the defendants appealed.54  
While on appeal, Tanner’s attorney received another unsolicited 
statement by a juror, attesting a similar story as the first juror’s statement.55 
This time, however, the juror gave more details into what he described as 
“one big party.”56 The juror alleged that 
(1) at least seven jurors, including himself, had consumed alcohol, 
including pitchers of beers, liters of wine, and multiple mixed 
drinks;  
(2) four jurors, including himself, “smoked marijuana quite 
regularly” throughout the trial;  
(3) two jurors ingested cocaine several times each; 
(4) one juror sold another juror “a quarter pound of marijuana”; and  
(5) one juror “took marijuana, cocaine, and drug paraphernalia into 
the courthouse.”57 
According to the juror, he came forward “to clear [his] conscience” because 
he believed “Mr. Tanner should have a better opportunity to get somebody 
that would review the facts right.”58 
Despite the shocking allegations, the district court denied a new trial, and 
the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.59 
3. Supreme Court Affirms 
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts’ decisions holding that 
juror intoxication is not considered an extraneous influence and that 
                                                                                                                 
 51. Id. at 113. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id.  
 54. Id. at 115. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. (quoting and citing the juror’s affidavit). 
 57. Id. at 115–16 (quoting and citing the juror’s affidavit). 
 58. Id. at 116 (quoting and citing the juror’s affidavit). 
 59. Id.; see United States v. Conover, 772 F.2d 765, 767 (11th Cir. 1985). 
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multiple trial safeguards already protect defendants from juror 
misconduct.60 In rejecting Tanner’s demand for juror testimony, the Court 
also relied upon the significant public policy concerns supporting the no-
impeachment rule.61 
Writing for the majority, Justice O’Connor first looked to whether the 
alleged juror misconduct fit one of the exceptions of FRE 606(b)62—
namely, whether juror intoxication is an “external influence.”63 In Mattox v. 
United States, the Supreme Court first recognized an exception for 
“extraneous influence[s]” on juries.64 Since then, federal courts have “used 
this external/internal distinction to identify those instances in which juror 
testimony impeaching a verdict would be admissible.”65 Courts applying 
this framework have held that “allegations of the physical or mental 
incompetence of a juror [are] ‘internal’ rather than ‘external’ matters.”66 
In particular, the Court highlighted the case of United States v. 
Dioguardi.67 In Dioguardi, a juror wrote a letter to the defendant, post-trial, 
telling him she had clairvoyant abilities and knew he was a good man, 
despite his being guilty.68 The defense sought to impeach the verdict, 
alleging the juror’s incompetence as evidenced by her self-professed 
supernatural powers in her letter,69 but the court denied relief.70 The Second 
Circuit affirmed and concluded that generally “courts have refused to set 
aside a verdict, or even to make further inquiry, unless there be proof of an 
adjudication of insanity or mental incompetence closely in advance . . . .”71 
Therefore, juror intoxication does not rise to the level of misconduct or 
incompetence such that it may be deemed an outside influence.72 
Next, the Court discussed the substantial policy concerns in favor of 
limiting juror testimony except in cases of outside influence. Primarily, the 
Supreme Court focused on the concerns it first noted in McDonald in 1915: 
                                                                                                                 
 60. See Tanner, 483 U.S. at 121–27. 
 61. See id. at 119–21, 127. 
 62. See id. at 117–19. 
 63. See id. at 117–18. 
 64. Id. at 117 (quoting Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 149 (1892)); see also 
cases cited supra note 30. 
 65. Tanner, 483 U.S. at 117. 
 66. Id. at 118. 
 67. Id. at 118–19. 
 68. See United States v. Dioguardi, 492 F.2d 70, 75–78 (2d Cir. 1974). 
 69. See id. at 75 n.7 (reciting the juror’s letter in full). 
 70. See Tanner, 483 U.S. at 118. 
 71. Id. at 119 (quoting Dioguardi, 492 F.2d at 80). 
 72. See id. at 122. 
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[j]urors would be harassed and beset by the defeated party in an 
effort to secure from them evidence of facts which might 
establish misconduct sufficient to set aside a verdict. If evidence 
thus secured could be thus used, the result would be to make 
what was intended to be a private deliberation, the constant 
subject of public investigation—to the destruction of all 
frankness and freedom of discussion and conference.73 
The Court confirmed that those policy considerations still existed74 and 
expressed concerns that post-verdict “[a]llegations of juror misconduct” 
would substantially disrupt the finality of verdicts.75 Despite conceding that 
post-verdict investigations into jury deliberations would prove helpful in 
some cases, the Court concluded that “[i]t is not at all clear, however, that 
the jury system could survive such efforts to perfect it.”76 Therefore, public 
policy weighed in favor of prohibiting juror testimony of juror misconduct 
in order to prevent juror harassment, encourage full and frank jury 
deliberations, and promote the finality of verdicts. 
Finally, the Court considered the constitutional challenge to the criminal 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair and impartial trial.77 The Court 
determined that four trial safeguards protect a criminal defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right—apart from juror testimony. The first line of defense 
against juror misconduct is voir dire, during which counsel for both parties 
can assess a prospective juror’s competence and can accept or reject jurors 
accordingly.78 Second, during trial, jurors are “observable by the court, by 
counsel, and by court personnel.”79 Consequently, finality issues are 
negated if the court learns of the misconduct and remedies it before the 
verdict is decided.80 Third, jurors observe each other and are made aware of 
                                                                                                                 
 73. Id. at 120 (quoting McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267–68 (1915)); see supra 
notes 30–32 and accompanying text. 
 74. See Tanner, 483 U.S. at 120. 
 75. Id. (“Allegations of juror misconduct, incompetency, or inattentiveness, raised for 
the first time days, weeks, or months after the verdict, seriously disrupt the finality of the 
process.”) (citing Virgin Islands v. Nicholas, 759 F.2d 1073, 1081 (3d Cir. 1985)). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 127. 
 78. Id. Though, it is worth noting that jurors shall not be excluded because of their race. 
See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986); see also discussion infra notes 190–201 
(explaining how Batson may play a role in the development of Peña-Rodriguez 
jurisprudence). 
 79. Tanner, 483 U.S. at 127 (citing United States v. Provenzano, 620 F.2d 985, 996–97 
(3d Cir. 1980)). 
 80. See id. 
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procedures for reporting any misconduct prior to deliberations.81 Lastly, 
parties may still seek to impeach a verdict using “nonjuror evidence,”82 
which the trial judge invited Tanner’s attorney to provide after rejecting the 
initial juror’s testimony.83 Because these safeguards were in place, the 
Court reasoned Tanner’s Sixth Amendment right was not violated. After 
establishing that the aforementioned trial safeguards insulated Tanner’s 
Sixth Amendment right and that juror intoxication is not an extraneous 
influence, the Supreme Court held that the juror testimony was correctly 
excluded.84 
B. Warger v. Shauers  
The Supreme Court’s holding in Tanner unified lower courts’ 
approaches to post-verdict inquiries,85 and the Court did not interpret FRE 
606(b) or comparable state rules until Warger v. Shauers86 in 2014. 
1. Trial Level and on Appeal 
While riding his motorcycle in South Dakota, Gregory Warger was 
struck from behind by a truck driven by Randy Shauers.87 Warger suffered 
devastating injuries as a result of the accident, including the loss of his 
leg.88 Both parties claimed the other was at fault, and “Warger sued Shauers 
for negligence” in a civil trial.89 
The jury found in favor of Shauers, who was driving the truck.90 Shortly 
after the trial, however, one juror informed the plaintiff’s counsel that the 
foreperson, Regina Whipple, expressed pro-defendant views in the 
deliberation room.91 According to the juror’s affidavit, Whipple admitted 
that her daughter had been at fault in a similar vehicle accident.92 
                                                                                                                 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id.; see also supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text. 
 84. See Tanner, 483 U.S. at 127. 
 85. See Huebner, supra note 12, at 1487–90 (discussing how Tanner’s “framework has 
gained widespread acceptance in the states” and how “once there was a diversity of 
approaches to the admissibility of juror testimony, with each state balancing fairness to the 
litigants with the important goal of protecting the jury system, there is now staid uniformity 
and little experimentation”). 
 86. 574 U.S. 40 (2014). 
 87. Id. at 42. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 43. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
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Specifically, the juror alleged Whipple even said that “if her daughter had 
been sued, it would have ruined her life.”93 
Before the jury was empaneled, during voir dire, counsel extensively 
questioned prospective jurors about whether they would be able to be fair 
and impartial in a civil negligence case.94 For each question, Whipple 
answered affirmatively that she could be an impartial juror.95 Thus, upon 
hearing of Whipple’s pro-defendant bias, Warger’s counsel sought a new 
trial because Whipple likely would have not been empaneled had she told 
the truth during voir dire.96 The district court denied Warger’s motion for a 
new trial because the juror’s testimony did not fit one of FRE 606(b)’s 
exceptions.97 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the juror’s testimony of 
Whipple’s bias did not fit the definition of “extraneous prejudicial 
information,” as found in FRE 606(b)(2)(A).98 The Eighth Circuit reasoned 
that prejudices and biases are personal and, therefore, internal rather than 
external evidence.99 Furthermore, despite a circuit split on this issue, the 
Eighth Circuit sided with the majority of circuit courts in holding that FRE 
606(b) applies to juror evidence “that a juror lied during voir dire.”100 
2. Supreme Court Affirms 
The Supreme Court applied a straight-forward analysis to this case. First, 
FRE 606(b) applies to “inquir[ies] into the validity of a verdict.”101 Second, 
moving for a new trial because a juror lied during voir dire is “plainly” an 
inquiry into the jury’s verdict.102 Third, FRE 606(b) applies, so the evidence 
                                                                                                                 
 93. Id. (quoting the juror’s affidavit). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. The basis of the plaintiff’s motion for new trial was that the juror’s affidavit 
satisfied the requirements of McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, which 
requires a party to “demonstrate that a juror failed to answer honestly a material question on 
voir dire, and . . . that a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge 
for cause.” Id. (quoting McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556 
(1984)). But, before the plaintiff could even prove that the juror’s affidavit fulfilled the 
McDonough requirements, the juror’s testimony had to be admitted under FRE 606(b). See 
id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 44. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 606(b)(1)). 
 102. Id. at 44–45. 
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must fit one of FRE 606(b)’s three exceptions.103 In this case, the Supreme 
Court held that the juror’s testimony of Whipple’s alleged pro-defendant 
bias did not fit any of the exceptions.104 
Despite couching its opinion in simplistic terms at times,105 the Court 
supplied a robust discussion of why FRE 606(b) applied in this situation 
and why the juror’s testimony should be excluded. The Court began its 
analysis by reciting the history of the no-impeachment rule leading up to 
the codification of FRE 606(b).106 By adopting the narrower federal rule, 
the Court reasoned, Congress purposely chose to exclude all juror 
testimony that did not meet one of FRE 606(b)’s exceptions, when offered 
during an inquiry into the validity of a verdict.107 Therefore, the Court’s 
analysis of “simply accord[ing] Rule 606(b)’s terms their plain meaning”108 
aligned with courts’ traditional treatment juror testimonies.109 
Next, the Court rejected two of Warger’s theories. First, Warger argued 
that the focus of his motion for a new trial was on voir dire because 
Whipple allegedly lied during voir dire.110 Thus, vacating the verdict is the 
only remedy to rectify the wrong that transpired during voir dire.111 But the 
Court disagreed with Warger because the language of FRE 606(b)—
“[d]uring an inquiry into the validity of a verdict”112—simply means 
“during a proceeding in which the verdict may be rendered invalid.”113  
Second, Warger argued that civil litigants, like criminal defendants, have 
a right to an impartial trial.114 Accordingly, Warger’s constitutional right, 
which is largely protected by voir dire,115 compels admittance of juror 
testimony in this case.116 To refute this argument, the Court again pointed to 
                                                                                                                 
 103. See id. 
 104. Id. at 51. 
 105. See, e.g., id. at 44 (stating that, in announcing the holding of the case, the Court 
“simply accord[s] Rule 606(b)’s terms their plain meaning”) (emphasis added); id. at 48 
(stating that the plaintiff “seek[s] to rebut this straightforward understanding of Rule 
606(b)”) (emphasis added). 
 106. See id. at 45–48; see also discussion supra Part II. 
 107. Warger, 574 U.S. at 48. 
 108. Id. at 44. 
 109. See id. at 45–48. 
 110. Id. at 48–49. 
 111. Id.  
 112. FED. R. EVID. 606(b). 
 113. Warger, 574 U.S. at 49. 
 114. Id. at 50. 
 115. See id. (citing Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36 (1986) (plurality opinion); Ham v. 
South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 527 (1973)). 
 116. Id. 
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the common-law history and language of FRE 606(b), which lacks any 
ambiguity.117 But more importantly, the Court’s decision in Tanner 
supplied the answer:118 the safeguards detailed in Tanner,119 including voir 
dire, protect a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right.120 Therefore, 
even if one safeguard is allegedly compromised, the remaining safeguards 
still protect a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights.121 
Ultimately, the Court held that the juror’s testimony did not fit the FRE 
606(b)(2)(A) exception.122 Moreover, by applying the Tanner analysis to 
this civil case and by precluding the juror’s testimony, the Supreme Court 
affirmed that the no-impeachment rule does not violate the Sixth 
Amendment.123 
IV. Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado 
Tanner and Warger appeared to foreclose arguments that the 
Constitution compels post-verdict juror testimony about juror misconduct in 
the deliberation room. But the Supreme Court reversed course in Peña-
Rodriguez v. Colorado.124 The issue presented in Peña-Rodriguez was 
whether one juror may testify about another juror’s statements 
demonstrating overt racial bias or animus to impeach a verdict, when those 
statements played a significant role in reaching the verdict.125 The Supreme 
Court ruled affirmatively, holding FRE 606(b) and comparable state 
statutes unconstitutional when applied to cases involving racist statements 
made by jurors during deliberation.126 Peña-Rodriguez marked a significant 
                                                                                                                 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. (“[A]ny claim that Rule 606(b) is unconstitutional in circumstances such as these 
is foreclosed by our decision in Tanner.”). 
 119. See supra notes 77–83 and accompanying text. 
 120. Warger, 574 U.S. at 51. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. See id. (“In Tanner, we concluded that Rule 606(b) precluded a criminal defendant 
from introducing evidence that multiple jurors had been intoxicated during trial, rejecting the 
contention that this exclusion violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right[.] . . . 
Similarly here, a party's right to an impartial jury remains protected despite Rule 606(b)'s 
removal of one means of ensuring that jurors are unbiased. Even if jurors lie in voir dire in a 
way that conceals bias, juror impartiality is adequately assured by the parties' ability to bring 
to the court's attention any evidence of bias before the verdict is rendered, and to employ 
nonjuror evidence even after the verdict is rendered.”). 
 124. 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017). 
 125. See id. at 861.  
 126. Id. at 869. 
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shift in the no-impeachment rule and may have profound constitutional 
effects moving forward. 
A. The State Trial 
In 2007, Miguel Angel Peña-Rodriguez, a Hispanic man, was charged 
with harassment, unlawful sexual contact, and attempted sexual assault of 
two teenage sisters.127 Both sisters identified the defendant as their 
assailant.128 Before the jury was empaneled, prospective jurors were given a 
written questionnaire asking them, inter alia, if “there [is] anything about 
you that you feel would make it difficult for you to be a fair juror in this 
case?”129 Moreover, at voir dire, prospective jurors were asked whether they 
had any reason why they could not be impartial in this trial, and “[n]one of 
the empaneled jurors expressed any reservations based on racial or any 
other bias.”130 After the trial and subsequent jury deliberation, the jury 
found the defendant guilty.131  
B. Jurors Come Forward—Motion for New Trial 
After the jury rendered the verdict, however, two jurors approached the 
defense counsel and said privately that another juror, Juror H.C., had made 
racially biased statements about the defendant and his alibi witness.132 With 
approval by the court, the defense counsel obtained sworn affidavits from 
the two jurors testifying to the following:  
H.C. told the other jurors that he “believed the defendant was 
guilty because, in [H.C.'s] experience as an ex-law enforcement 
officer, Mexican men had a bravado that caused them to believe 
they could do whatever they wanted with women.” The jurors 
reported that H.C. stated his belief that Mexican men are 
physically controlling of women because of their sense of 
entitlement, and further stated, “‘I think he did it because he's 
Mexican and Mexican men take whatever they want.’” 
According to the jurors, H.C. further explained that, in his 
                                                                                                                 
 127. Id. at 861. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Peña-Rodriguez v. People, 350 P.3d 287, 288 (Colo. 2015); see Peña-Rodriguez, 
137 S. Ct. at 861. 
 130. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 861. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
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experience, “nine times out of ten Mexican men were guilty of 
being aggressive toward women and young girls.”133  
Finally, the jurors testified that Juror H.C. disputed the credibility of the 
defendant’s Hispanic alibi witness because he was in the country illegally, 
which was later proven false.134 
At the hearing on the motion for a new trial, the trial court recognized the 
juror’s evident bias but denied the motion because Colorado Rule of 
Evidence 606(b)—which is modeled after FRE 606(b)—does not permit 
juror testimony concerning such evidence.135 Thereafter, the Colorado 
Court of Appeals and the Colorado Supreme Court both affirmed the trial 
court’s denial.136 
C. Justice Kennedy’s Opinion 
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Colorado Supreme 
Court and created a new exception to FRE 606(b) in cases “where a juror 
makes a clear statement that indicates he or she relied on racial stereotypes 
or animus to convict a criminal defendant[.]”137 Specifically, the Court held 
that “the Sixth Amendment requires that the no-impeachment rule give way 
in order to permit the trial court to consider the evidence of the juror’s 
statement and any resulting denial of the jury trial guarantee.”138 
Justice Kennedy commenced the Court’s analysis by reciting the history 
of the no-impeachment rule leading up to the modern-day codification of 
FRE 606(b),139 as well as precedent cases involving juror testimony.140 The 
Court emphasized the history of the no-impeachment rule by charting the 
courses of two historical approaches to juror testimony.141 Moreover, 
though the Federal Rules of Evidence codified the common law and a 
majority of states had adopted that rule, the Court noted that at least sixteen 
states142 and three federal circuit courts143 had recognized an exception 
                                                                                                                 
 133. Id. at 862 (quoting jurors’ affidavits) (internal citations omitted). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 869. 
 138. Id. 
 139. See supra Part II. 
 140. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 863–67; see supra Part III. 
 141. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 863–65. 
 142. See id. at 886 (providing an appendix listing cases in which the respective states 
have judicially recognized a racial-bias exception). 
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when racial bias is used to reach a verdict.144 Finally, the Court addressed 
the concerns expressed in Tanner v. United States and Warger v. 
Shauers.145 
Having recited the evolution of the no-impeachment rule, Justice 
Kennedy proceeded to the heart of the Court’s reasoning: given our nation’s 
struggle with extinguishing racism from the justice system, “[t]ime and 
again, this Court has been called upon to enforce the Constitution’s 
guarantee against state-sponsored racial discrimination in the jury 
system.”146 The Court cited many cases wherein it sought to expunge racial 
discrimination from the justice system and noted that allowing racial bias in 
the jury rooms is “‘especially pernicious.’”147 Moreover, Justice Kennedy 
distinguished racial bias from the juror misconduct in other cases involving 
the no-impeachment rule. 148 Thus, because “racial bias implicates unique 
historical, constitutional, and institutional concerns,” it is “a familiar and 
recurring evil that, if left unaddressed, would risk systemic injury to the 
administration of justice.”149 
In articulating this new rule, the Court explained that purging juries of 
racial bias is more “necessary to prevent a systemic loss of confidence in 
jury verdicts” than any damage to the jury and verdict safeguards laid out in 
Tanner.150 But fleeting or inconsequential remarks on race do not fit this 
new exception because the Court narrowed its holding to evidence of overt 
racial bias or discrimination.151 Consequently, “[t]o qualify, the statement 
must tend to show that racial animus was a significant motivating factor in 
the juror’s vote to convict.”152 Beyond that directive, however, the Court 
did not provide a framework or test to help lower courts determine when a 
                                                                                                                 
 143. See id. at 865 (citing United States v. Villar, 586 F.3d 76, 87–88 (1st Cir. 2009); 
United States v. Henley, 238 F.3d 1111, 1119–21 (9th Cir. 2001); Shillcutt v. Gagnon, 827 
F.2d 1155, 1158–60 (7th Cir. 1987)). 
 144. Id. Later in the opinion, however, Justice Kennedy stated that 17 jurisdictions had a 
racial-bias exception prior to Peña-Rodriguez. Id. at 870. 
 145. See supra Part III. 
 146. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 867. 
 147. Id. at 868 (quoting Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 555 (1979)). 
 148. Id. (“Racial bias of the kind alleged in this case differs in critical ways from the 
compromise verdict in McDonald, the drug and alcohol abuse in Tanner, or the pro-
defendant bias in Warger.”). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 869. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
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juror’s racially charged statements require admission of juror testimony 
about those statements.153 
Finally, the Supreme Court recognized that Juror H.C.’s statements, 
which “were egregious and unmistakable in their reliance on racial bias,” fit 
this new exception.154 Therefore, the Court reversed and remanded the 
case.155 
D. Justice Alito’s Dissent 
Joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas,156 Justice Alito 
attacked the majority’s holding on four grounds: (1) the extensive history of 
no-impeachment rule; (2) the safeguards elucidated in Tanner that are in 
place throughout a trial; (3) the lack of a hierarchy of fairness or 
impartiality under the Sixth Amendment; and (4) the majority’s willingness 
to undermine the underlying public policy concerns the no-impeachment 
rule was designed to protect.157 
Justice Alito began his dissent by recounting the exhaustive history of 
the no-impeachment rule158 before reiterating the holdings of Tanner and 
Warger.159 In particular, Justice Alito focused on the “crucial interests” 
advanced by the no-impeachment rule and the trial safeguards that the 
Tanner Court identified as protecting criminal defendants’ Sixth 
Amendment right against juror misconduct.160 In its opinion, the majority 
addressed two of these safeguards—voir dire and pre-verdict juror 
reports—and found them ineffective against the type of racial bias the 
holding attempts to eliminate.161 Justice Alito disagreed and argued that the 
                                                                                                                 
 153. See id. 
 154. Id. at 870. 
 155. Id. at 871. 
 156. In addition, Justice Thomas wrote a separate dissenting opinion. See id. at 871–74 
(Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 157. Id. at 875–85 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 158. See id. at 875–78 (Alito, J., dissenting); see also discussion supra Part II. 
 159. See Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 878–82 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 160. Id. at 879–80 (Alito, J., dissenting); see Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 127 
(1987) (“Petitioners’ Sixth Amendment interests in an unimpaired jury, on the other hand, 
are protected by several aspects of the trial process. The suitability of an individual for the 
responsibility of jury service, of course, is examined during voir dire. Moreover, during the 
trial the jury is observable by the court, by counsel, and by court personnel. Moreover, jurors 
are observable by each other, and may report inappropriate juror behavior to the 
court before they render a verdict. Finally, after the trial a party may seek to impeach the 
verdict by nonjuror evidence of misconduct.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 161. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 880 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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majority “provide[d] no good reason to depart from the calculus made in 
Tanner and Warger.”162 
Next, Justice Alito contested the majority’s argument that racial bias 
presents a unique challenge to the justice system and is thus worthy of its 
own exception to FRE 606(b).163 While Justice Alito agreed with the 
majority on the pernicious nature of racial discrimination, he emphasized 
the language of the Sixth Amendment and its corresponding 
jurisprudence.164 Specifically, the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to 
an impartial jury but does not indicate a hierarchy of impartiality.165 
Moreover, Justice Alito warned that the majority’s rationale would likely 
open the door to other types of discriminations being recognized. But how 
future courts will categorize such impartialities and whether the Sixth 
Amendment offers protection in such cases remains unclear.166 
Finally, the dissent pointed out that the majority’s holding would 
exacerbate public policy concerns surrounding juror testimony—namely, 
juror harassment and the finality of verdicts.167 By allowing post-verdict 
scrutiny into jury deliberations, Justice Alito warned of “an increase in 
harassment, arm-twisting, and outright coercion” of jurors,168 which may 
“undermine the finality of verdicts.”169 These public policy concerns played 
a major role in the development of the no-impeachment rule, and Justice 
Alito argued that the majority’s holding in Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado 
would bring those harms to the forefront.170 
V. The Effect of Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado 
Given the long, seemingly settled history of the no-impeachment rule, 
the Supreme Court’s holding in Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado has profound 
ramifications both now and in the course of time. Accordingly, Part V first 
examines the immediate impact of Peña-Rodriguez, including its effect on 
                                                                                                                 
 162. Id. at 882 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 163. Id. at 882–84 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 164. See id. at 882 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 165. See id. (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Nothing in the text or history of the Amendment or in 
the inherent nature of the jury trial right suggests that the extent of the protection provided 
by the Amendment depends on the nature of a jury's partiality or bias.”). 
 166. Id. at 883–84 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 167. Id. at 884–85 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 168. Id. at 885 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267 
(1915)). 
 169. Id. (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 170. Id. (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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the no-impeachment rule, and addresses some unanswered issues that courts 
must navigate moving forward. Next, Part V explains the reason for an 
early consensus that Peña-Rodriguez will be expanded—potentially to civil 
cases and eventually to other forms of bias and discrimination. 
A. Immediate Impact: FRE 606(b) Is Now Facially Incomplete 
Peña-Rodriguez holds that the no-impeachment rule must yield to a 
criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights when jurors use explicit 
racial bias to reach a verdict.171 In effect, the Supreme Court created an 
additional exception to the no-impeachment rule that renders FRE 606(b) 
incomplete and unconstitutional for such cases. Moreover, because the 
Court’s holding in Peña-Rodriguez is based on the Sixth Amendment—
which is applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment172—this 
newly created exception affects state trials in addition to federal trials, 
implicating each state’s no-impeachment rule. As a result, Oklahoma’s 
Rule 2606(B) is similarly incomplete. 
In addition to the partial invalidation of FRE 606(b) and comparable 
state rules, the Peña-Rodriguez holding creates uncertainty about when 
racial bias or animus crosses the threshold and becomes subject to 
testimony by other jurors.173 Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion did not 
provide a clear-cut rule or framework to address future challenges174—
much like Justice Scalia’s decision not to define “testimonial” in the 
                                                                                                                 
 171. See id. at 869–70. 
 172. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) (“The deep commitment of the 
Nation to the right of jury trial in serious criminal cases as a defense against arbitrary law 
enforcement qualifies for protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and must therefore be respected by the States.”). 
 173. This uncertainty exists because “[n]ot every offhand comment indicating racial bias 
or hostility will justify setting aside the no-impeachment bar to allow further judicial 
inquiry.” Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869. Therefore, “there must be a showing that one or 
more jurors made statements exhibiting overt racial bias that cast serious doubt on the 
fairness and impartiality of the jury’s deliberations and resulting verdict.” Id. But “[w]hether 
that threshold showing has been satisfied is a matter committed to the substantial discretion 
of the trial court.” Id. 
 174. See id. at 869–70; see also Jason Koffler, Note, Laboratories of Equal Justice: What 
State Experience Portends for Expansion of the Peña-Rodriguez Exception Beyond Race, 
118 COLUM. L. REV. 1801, 1823 (2018) (“Pena-Rodriguez, groundbreaking as it may have 
been, was a relatively barebones decision that avoided meaningful engagement with the 
many procedural and doctrinal issues created by subjecting the no-impeachment rule to a 
constitutional racial-bias exception in criminal cases.”). 
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seminal Sixth Amendment case Crawford v. Washington.175 Nevertheless, 
Justice Kennedy did provide a starting point by requiring “a showing that 
one or more jurors made statements exhibiting overt racial bias that cast 
serious doubt on the fairness and impartiality of the jury's deliberations and 
resulting verdict.”176 But determining whether a juror’s racial bias or 
animus crosses this threshold or is a significant enough factor in reaching 
the verdict will be left to the trial court’s discretion.177  
Rather than elucidating a bright-line rule, the Supreme Court will rely on 
the seventeen jurisdictions that already have judicially created racial-bias 
exceptions to their FRE 606(b) counterparts.178 But, as Justice Kennedy 
briefly noted, “there is a diversity of approaches” among those 
jurisdictions.179 For example, not every state with a judicially recognized 
racial-bias exception based its exception on constitutional principles.180 Of 
those states that did, some states relied upon the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses to establish their exceptions.181 
Meanwhile, Peña-Rodriguez was based on the Sixth Amendment and 
accordingly applies to all states. Therefore, states with racial-bias 
exceptions that were based on other constitutional principles may not 
provide much help to other states because Peña-Rodriguez has now 
subsumed and superseded that case law. Because Justice Kennedy entrusted 
states to develop their own procedures and standards when applying Peña-
Rodriguez182 and because the federal rule has not been amended, it is 
                                                                                                                 
 175. Compare Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51–53, 68 (2004) (“We leave for 
another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of ‘testimonial.’”), with Peña-
Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 870 (“The Court also does not decide the appropriate standard for 
determining when evidence of racial bias is sufficient to require that the verdict be set aside 
and a new trial be granted.”).  
 176. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869. 
 177. See id. In fact, the trial court will have “substantial discretion . . . in light of all 
circumstances, including the content and timing of the alleged statements and the reliability 
of the proffered evidence.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 178. See id. at 870 (“[T]he Court relies on the experiences of the 17 jurisdictions that 
have recognized a racial-bias exception to the no-impeachment rule—some for over half a 
century—with no signs of an increase in juror harassment or a loss of juror willingness to 
engage in searching and candid deliberations. The experience of these jurisdictions, and the 
experience of the courts going forward, will inform the proper exercise of trial judge 
discretion in these and related matters.”); see also id. at 886 (providing an appended list of 
jurisdictions that have a judicially recognized racial bias exception). 
 179. Id. at 865. 
 180. See Koffler, supra note 174, at 1828–30. 
 181. Id. at 1829. 
 182. See supra notes 174–78 and accompanying text. 
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unclear how each state will approach such a precedent-setting decision, 
leaving lawyers in the dark.183 
Oklahoma, in particular, faces a potentially steep learning curve. Like 
FRE 606(b), Oklahoma’s Rule 2606(B) is silent concerning a juror’s use of 
racial bias or animus in the jury room,184 and Oklahoma has no prior 
jurisprudence to consult.185 As a result, the absence of a racial-bias 
exception in the evidence rules has set a trap for unwary attorneys. As the 
introductory hypothetical illustrates, perpetuating an incomplete and 
unconstitutional evidence rule threatens the administration of justice by 
unnecessarily and indirectly obscuring a prominent addition to evidence 
law. Apart from criminal defendants, public defenders are most affected by 
this change. They are also typically in the best position to learn of alleged 
juror misconduct. For example, in two of the three Supreme Court cases 
interpreting the no-impeachment rule, jurors approached the defense 
counsel with testimony of another juror’s misconduct.186 In the third case—
a civil suit—the juror approached the plaintiff’s counsel shortly after his 
client lost.187 Unfortunately, however, public defenders are notoriously 
overworked and underpaid188 and, as a result, may be susceptible to errors 
                                                                                                                 
 183. See Lauren Crump, Comment, Removing Race from the Jury Deliberation Room: 
The Shortcomings of Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado and How to Address Them, 52 U. RICH. L. 
REV. 475, 492–93 (2018) (“Allowing trial courts to make case-by-case determinations as to 
whether racial bias occurred will lead to wide-spread disparities in the application of the no-
impeachment rule exception, and instances of racial bias will inevitably creep into jury 
verdicts.”). 
 184. See 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2606(B) (2011). 
 185. Contra Washington v. Berhe, 444 P.3d 1172, 1179 (Wash. 2019) (“By the time 
Peña-Rodriguez was decided, Washington had already begun to develop procedures for 
addressing motions for a new trial based on allegations of racial bias of a juror.”) (citing 
Washington v. Jackson, 879 P.2d 307 (Wash. 1994)). 
 186. See supra Section III.A and Part IV. 
 187. See supra Section III.B. 
 188. See, e.g., Heather Perry Baxter, At a Crossroads: Where the Indigent Defense Crisis 
and the Legal Education Crisis Intersect, 18 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 25, 29 
(2016) (discussing a then-recent study that found public defenders in Missouri spent an 
“alarmingly small amount of time . . . on each case”); Sara Mayeux, What Gideon Did, 116 
COLUM. L. REV. 15, 19 (2016) (“[S]ome states appear worse than others, but public 
defenders nationwide are underfunded and overworked.”); see also Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & 
Jugal K. Patel, One Lawyer, 194 Felony Cases, and No Time, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/01/31/us/public-defender-case-loads.html; Alexa 
Van Brunt, Poor People Rely on Public Defenders Who Are Too Overworked to Defend 
Them, GUARDIAN (June 17, 2015, 7:30 EDT), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/ 
2015/jun/17/poor-rely-public-defenders-too-overworked.  
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and oversights. Therefore, until evidence codes are revised to reflect this 
recent change in law, the administration of justice may be unnecessarily 
hindered by incomplete no-impeachment rules in Oklahoma and 
nationwide. 
B. Future Impact: Peña-Rodriguez May Have Opened Pandora’s Box 
Evaluating the longer-term effects of the Peña-Rodriguez decision also 
presents a formidable challenge. Because the Supreme Court issued a 
significant ruling without offering much guidance concerning its 
application,189 early scholarship has sought to fill in the gaps. The 
prevailing consensus maintains that the holding in Peña-Rodriguez will 
likely be expanded in two ways: the racial-bias exception will apply to civil 
cases and will eventually incorporate additional forms of discrimination.190 
Even the Advisory Committee has recognized that attorneys will argue to 
expand the Peña-Rodriguez holding because “[t]he scope of the 
constitutional right remains to be developed.”191 Whether courts ultimately 
expand Peña-Rodriguez remains to be seen, but attorneys have already 
sought Supreme Court review to advocate for Peña-Rodriguez’s application 
to other forms of discrimination—specifically, juror bias based on the 
defendant’s sexual orientation.192 Though threats of expansion may seem 
distant, they are looming. 
                                                                                                                 
Here in Oklahoma, public defenders also face similar issues with understaffed, underfunded, 
and overworked public defenders’ offices. See, e.g., Josh Dulaney, Biding Time: “Do the 
Most with the Least”, OKLAHOMAN (June 28, 2017), https://newsok.com/special/ 
article/5553775.  
 189. See supra notes 172–76 and accompanying text. 
 190. See generally, e.g., Jarod S. Gonzalez, The New Batson: Opening the Door of the 
Jury Deliberation Room After Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 62 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 397, 409 
(2018) (“The Supreme Court opened the door and created the exception” in criminal cases, 
but the policy reasons the Court provided “fit just as well with the administration of justice 
by civil juries as they do with the administration of justice by criminal juries.”); Koffler, 
supra note 174; see also Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 884 (2017) (Alito, J., 
dissenting) (“Today's decision—especially if it is expanded in the ways that seem likely—
will invite the harms that no-impeachment rules were designed to prevent.”) (emphasis 
added). 
 191. Adv. Comm. on Rules of Evidence, Report to Standing Committee (May 7, 2017) 
[hereinafter Report to Standing Committee], in Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure, 
June 2017 Meeting Materials 735, 742 (June 12, 2017), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/| 
default/files/2017-06-standing-agenda_book_0.pdf. 
 192. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Rhines v. South Dakota, 138 S. Ct. 2660 (2018) 
(No. 17-8791) (arguing defendant was subject to discrimination, within the jury room, based 
on his homosexuality); see also Jordan S. Rubin, Gay Death Row Inmate Wants SCOTUS 
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The first step toward expanding the Peña-Rodriguez holding will likely 
result from the application of its analysis to civil cases. Because the 
Supreme Court based its holding on the Sixth Amendment and a criminal 
defendant’s right to a fair and impartial trial,193 Peña-Rodriguez is currently 
inapplicable in civil cases where jurors express racial bias in reaching their 
verdict.194 Anticipating the expansion to civil cases is quite reasonable, 
however, given its striking resemblance to Batson v. Kentucky and its 
progeny of cases.195  
In Batson, the Supreme Court held that race-based discrimination in the 
form of peremptory challenges during voir dire of a criminal case is 
unconstitutional.196 Like Peña-Rodriguez, Batson carved out a narrow 
exception to a broad right—the right to exclude a potential juror using a 
peremptory challenge—and only applied to criminal cases and racial 
discrimination.197 But five years later, the Court expanded Batson to apply 
in civil cases as well.198 The main difference between Batson and Peña-
Rodriguez, however, is that the former was grounded in the Equal 
Protection Clause, while the latter relied on the Sixth Amendment.199 Some 
scholars posit that the underlying theme in both cases is an equal protection 
issue,200 but the Court chose a more measured approach by basing Peña-
                                                                                                                 
Review of Jury Bias Claim, BLOOMBERG LAW (June 12, 2018, 2:08 PM), https://news. 
bloomberglaw.com/white-collar-and-criminal-law/gay-death-row-inmate-wants-scotus-
review-of-jury-bias-claim (via subscription).  
 193. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869 (“[T]he Court now holds that where a juror 
makes a clear statement that indicates he or she relied on racial stereotypes or animus to 
convict a criminal defendant, the Sixth Amendment requires that the no-impeachment rule 
give way in order to permit the trial court to consider the evidence of the juror's statement 
and any resulting denial of the jury trial guarantee.”). 
 194. See id.  
 195. See generally Gonzalez, supra note 190. 
 196. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986). 
 197. Gonzalez, supra note 190, at 404. 
 198. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616–17 (1991); see Gonzalez, 
supra note 190, at 404, 408. 
 199. Compare Batson, 476 U.S. at 89 (“Accordingly, the component of the jury selection 
process at issue here, the State's privilege to strike individual jurors through peremptory 
challenges, is subject to the commands of the Equal Protection Clause.”), with Peña-
Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869 (“[W]here a juror makes a clear statement that indicates he or 
she relied on racial stereotypes or animus to convict a criminal defendant, the Sixth 
Amendment requires that the no-impeachment rule give way in order to permit the trial court 
to consider the evidence of the juror's statement and any resulting denial of the jury trial 
guarantee.”); see Gonzalez, supra note 190, at 404. 
 200. See Gonzalez, supra note 190, at 405 (“The heart of both the Peña-Rodriguez and 
Batson decisions is really an equal protection concern, although Peña-Rodriguez is framed 
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Rodriguez on the Sixth Amendment because of the susceptibility for 
expansion if framed using the Equal Protection Clause.201 In fact, in Justice 
Alito’s dissent, he postulates that Peña-Rodriguez is actually an equal 
protection case instead of a Sixth Amendment case,202 making the 
majority’s holding more susceptible to expansion.203 Therefore, in order to 
convince courts that Peña-Rodriguez should apply to civil cases, attorneys 
must argue that Peña-Rodriguez is actually an Equal Protection Clause case 
cloaked in Sixth Amendment robes.204 If subsequent courts agree, then the 
trajectory of Peña-Rodriguez will likely resemble that of Batson. 
The second step in Peña-Rodriguez’s evolutionary trajectory may require 
the no-impeachment rule to yield to the Sixth Amendment in order to allow 
jurors to testify about other forms of bias or discrimination made in the jury 
room. In other words, the racial-bias exception will become a broader “bias 
exception.” Most notably, Justice Alito warned of this possibility in his 
dissent.205 Justice Alito worried that Peña-Rodriguez might be an equal 
protection case masquerading as a Sixth Amendment case,206 and, if courts 
                                                                                                                 
in the context of the Sixth Amendment . . . .”); Richard Lorren Jolly, The New Impartial Jury 
Mandate, 117 MICH. L. REV. 713, 751 (2019) (“Nevertheless, as Justice Alito’s dissent 
highlights, the holding seems to sound more in concepts drawn from the Fourteenth 
Amendment than it does in the Sixth Amendment.”); see also Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 
868 (stating that the holding is not an attempt to create a perfect jury but is rather an attempt 
at “coming ever closer to the promise of equal treatment under the law that is so central to a 
functioning democracy”) (emphasis added). 
 201. See Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 883 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Recasting this 
[decision] as an equal protection case would not provide a ground for limiting the holding to 
cases involving racial bias.”); Robert I. Correales, Is Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado Just a 
Drop in the Bucket or a Catalyst for Improving a Jury System Still Plagued by Racial Bias, 
and Still Badly in Need of Repairs?, 21 HARV. LATINX L. REV. 1, 11 (2018) (“Time will tell 
whether the Court's reluctance to fully deploy Equal Protection was an oversight or perhaps 
an intentional and strategic move to lay the first stone in the foundation of a more expansive 
doctrine.”). 
 202. See Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 883–84 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 203. See id. at 883–84 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Today's decision—especially if it is 
expanded in the ways that seem likely—will invite the harms that no-impeachment rules 
were designed to prevent.”) (emphasis added). 
 204. Gonzalez, supra note 190, at 408 (“[T]he winning argument for extending Peña-
Rodriguez to civil cases brought in federal district court is equal protection under the Fifth 
Amendment. This argument merely takes a page right out of the Batson and Edmonson 
playbook.”). Moreover, if Peña-Rodriguez were recast as an equal protection issue, it would 
also be based on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in order to apply 
to the states. 
 205. See Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 883–84 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 206. See supra text accompanying notes 196–201. 
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agree with him, then “[a]t a minimum, cases involving bias based on any 
suspect classification—such as national origin or religion—would merit 
equal treatment.”207 Justice Alito also agreed that bias based on gender or 
the exercise of First Amendment-protected activity would also garner 
similar protections.208 If the racial-bias exception is expanded, courts will 
likely look to equal protection jurisprudence to determine which suspect 
classifications should be protected. But, at this point, it is unclear where 
courts will draw the line among different forms of bias. According to 
Justice Alito, if Peña-Rodriguez is eventually framed as an equal protection 
concern, “convicting a defendant on the basis of any irrational classification 
would violate the Equal Protection Clause.”209  
Academic scholarship on this issue also tends to support Justice Alito’s 
contention that Peña-Rodriguez is primed to expand and incorporate other 
forms of bias or discrimination.210 Maybe more importantly, the Advisory 
Committee also believes that Peña-Rodriguez will be expanded or that, at 
the very least, defense attorneys will vigorously advocate for its 
expansion.211 This uncertainty—if, when, and to what extent Peña-
Rodriguez will be expanded—has complicated the remedial responses by 
                                                                                                                 
 207. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 883 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 208. Id. at 883–84 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 209. Id. at 884 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 210. See supra note 203 and accompanying text; Jolly, supra note 200, at 750 (“While 
the majority in Peña-Rodriguez is adamant that the decision is limited to racial biases in 
criminal cases, it is unlikely that the Court can identify a limiting principle to exclude 
testimony of bias against additional suspected classes . . . .”); Correales, supra note 201, at 
11 (“Time will tell whether the Court's reluctance to fully deploy Equal Protection was an 
oversight or perhaps an intentional and strategic move to lay the first stone in the foundation 
of a more expansive doctrine.”); Gonzalez, supra note 190, at 405 (“The United States 
Supreme Court cracked open the door of the jury deliberation room as a matter of 
Constitutional law in Peña-Rodriguez. Now that the door is open a little bit, it is not going to 
be shut.”); Koffler, supra note 174, at 1855–56 (“Both state experience with bias exceptions 
to the no-impeachment rule and the Court's own experience with Batson and related cases 
suggest expansion is coming. Significant pragmatic and normative reasons support such 
expansion.”). 
 211. See Adv. Comm. on Rules of Evidence, Spring 2017 Meeting Materials 279 (Apr. 
21, 2017), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/advisory_committee_on_rules_ 
of_evidence_-_spring_2017_meeting_materials.pdf [hereinafter Adv. Comm. Spring 2017 
Meeting] (“[T]here is a possibility that the constitutional right found in Peña-Rodriguez 
could be extended[—]for example, to statements that indicate a sexual bias, or a religious 
bias, or a bias against old people, or a failure to respect the defendant’s right not to testify,” 
and “[t]here is also a pretty fair possibility that the holding in Peña-Rodriguez could be 
extended to civil cases.”). 
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the Advisory Committee and state legislatures.212 As a result, only Virginia 
has updated their respective evidence rule,213 while the remaining 
jurisdictions are taking a wait-and-see approach. 
Another interesting wrinkle that compounds the uncertainty of the Peña-
Rodriguez decision is the recently changed makeup of the Supreme Court. 
Peña-Rodriguez was decided by a vote of 5-3 while Justice Scalia’s seat 
remained vacant following his death.214 Since then, Justice Gorsuch has 
been confirmed to the Supreme Court,215 and Justice Kennedy—the author 
of Peña-Rodriguez—has been replaced by Justice Kavanaugh.216 As a 
result, the Supreme Court has shifted, in theory, toward a conservative 
majority for the foreseeable future.217 How the new Supreme Court will 
approach juror misconduct cases is speculative, for now, but could play a 
major role in deciding whether Peña-Rodriguez will or should be expanded. 
VI. How Lawmakers Can Rectify This Discrepancy 
Despite the rule-altering holding in Peña-Rodriguez, FRE 606(b) is 
unchanged. The Advisory Committee has discussed amending FRE 606(b) 
but has yet to act,218 and only one state has updated its evidence code in 
                                                                                                                 
 212. See discussion infra Sections V.B, VI.A–C. 
 213. VA. R. EVID. 2:606(b)(ii)(d). Of course, as Justice Kennedy points out in the 
majority opinion, seventeen jurisdictions already have judicially recognized racial-bias 
exceptions, though none has explicated an exception in its evidence codes. See Peña-
Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 870; see also id. at 886 (providing an appendix listing the 
jurisdictions with a judicially recognized exception for evidence of racial bias). 
 214. See Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 860. Justice Kennedy was joined by Justices 
Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan in the majority, while Justices Alito, Roberts, and 
Thomas dissented. Id. 
 215. See Adam Liptak & Matt Flegenheimer, Neil Gorsuch Confirmed by Senate as 
Supreme Court Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/07/ 
us/politics/neil-gorsuch-supreme-court.html. 
 216. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Kavanaugh Is Sworn In After Close Confirmation Vote in 
Senate, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/06/us/politics/brett-
kavanaugh-supreme-court.html. 
 217. See Adam Liptak & Alicia Parlapiano, Conservatives Now in Charge, the Supreme 
Court Moved Right, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/ 
06/28/us/politics/supreme-court-2017-term-moved-right.html. 
 218. See Adv. Comm. Spring 2017 Meeting, supra note 211, at 276–83; Adv. Comm. on 
Rules of Evidence, Fall 2017 Meeting Materials 27–28 (Oct. 26–27, 2017), 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/a3_0.pdf; Adv. Comm. on Rules of Evidence, 
Spring 2018 Meeting Materials 17–18 (Apr. 26–27, 2018), https://www.uscourts.gov/ 
sites/default/files/agenda_book_advisory_committee_on_rules_of_evidence_-_final.pdf; 
Adv. Comm. on Rules of Evidence, Fall 2018 Meeting Materials 3–5 (Oct. 19, 2018), 
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response to Peña-Rodriguez.219 But why? As Part V illustrated, the 
expansion of the racial-bias exception is peering over the crest of the 
horizon, awaiting its inevitability. Meanwhile, the Advisory Committee and 
state legislators are playing a waiting game to see how the jurisdictional 
case law will develop.220 
At the first Advisory Committee meeting following the Peña-Rodriguez 
decision, the Committee acknowledged that “Rule 606(b) is 
unconstitutional as applied at least to racist statements made by jurors while 
deliberating in criminal cases.”221 In response, the Advisory Committee 
considered three proposed amendments, in addition to standing pat. The 
first proposal recommended a straight-forward exception, mirroring the 
holding in Peña-Rodriguez.222 The second proposal expanded the exception 
to include other forms of discrimination, in anticipation of the expansion of 
Peña-Rodriguez.223 The third proposal included a generic constitutional 
safeguard designed to capture any new exceptions recognized by the U.S. 
Supreme Court.224 Ultimately, however, the Advisory Committee took a 
wait-and-see approach, leaving FRE 606(b) incomplete and failing to 
provide states with any guidance on updating their respective rules.225 
Each proposed amendment has its benefits and downsides. The following 
sections introduce similar alternatives to update Oklahoma’s Rule 2606(B) 
and explain why playing the waiting game is a losing effort. The first 
alternative narrowly adopts the holding of Peña-Rodriguez, and the second 
alternative incorporates a more generous exception that has room to grow 
with subsequent case law. Though Oklahoma has mostly been lethargic 
                                                                                                                 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2018-10-evidence-agenda-book_0.pdf 
[hereinafter Adv. Comm. Fall 2018 Meeting]. Discussion of Peña-Rodriguez and possible 
amendments to FRE 606(b) was not on the agenda for the Advisory Committee’s most 
recent meeting. 
 219. See VA. R. EVID. 2:606(b)(ii)(d). 
 220. In fairness, Justice Kennedy also took this approach in Peña-Rodriguez. See 137 S. 
Ct. 855, 870 (2017) (“The experiences of these jurisdictions [that recognize a racial-bias 
exception], and the experience of the courts going forward, will inform the proper exercise 
of trial judge discretion in these and related matters.”). 
 221. Report to Standing Committee, supra note 191, at 742. 
 222. See Adv. Comm. Spring 2017 Meeting, supra note 211, at 278–80. 
 223. Id. at 280–81. 
 224. Id. at 281–83. 
 225. See Adv. Comm. Fall 2018 Meeting, supra note 218, at 47 (“The Chair wrapped up 
the discussion by noting that the issue would be tabled for one to two years to allow more 
time for case law to develop before the Committee reconsidered action on Rule 606(b).”). 
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toward amending its evidence code following federal rule changes,226 the 
Sooner State can provide clarity and completeness to its no-impeachment 
rule—all while encouraging other jurisdictions to amend their own no-
impeachment rules. 
A. Why Action Is Needed 
Each attorney is obligated to render effective counsel for his client 
through diligent and competent representation.227 Accordingly, any attorney 
faced with a situation similar to the one in Peña-Rodriguez should be aware 
of the Supreme Court’s holding and should, thus, be able to render effective 
counsel. Moreover, it is worth noting that in the age of Westlaw, even 
cursory legal research should uncover an on-point U.S. Supreme Court case 
                                                                                                                 
 226. Within the last thirty years, two federal rules—FRE 803(10) and 412—were 
affected by Supreme Court holdings and were subsequently amended by the Advisory 
Committee to ensure compliance with constitutional rights. In each case, the Advisory 
Committee took a different approach. 
In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court stated that FRE 803(10) searches 
can be testimonial and, thus, subject to the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause. See 
557 U.S. 305, 323 (2009). But the Supreme Court endorsed notice-and-demand statutes as a 
method of satisfying a criminal defendant’s confrontation rights. See id. at 325–28. 
Accordingly, the Advisory Committee included a narrow exception to FRE 803(10) that 
encapsulates the notice-and-demand statutes contemplated by the Supreme Court in 
Melendez-Diaz. FED. R. EVID. 803(10)(B); see id. 803(10)(B) advisory committee’s note to 
2013 amendment (“Rule 803(10) has been amended in response to Melendez-Diaz v. 
Massachusetts.”). 
In Olden v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court identified a situation in which a criminal 
defendant’s confrontation rights were violated when he was prohibited from discussing a key 
fact in a rape case because FRE 412 prevented inquiries into a victim’s sexual predisposition 
and prior sexual behavior. 488 U.S. 227, 231–32 (1988) (per curiam). As a result, the 
Advisory Committee instituted a broad constitutional safeguard in FRE 412 to ameliorate 
Olden-like situations in the future. FED. R. EVID. 412; see id. 412 advisory committee’s note 
to 1994 amendment. 
These two rule modifications are indicative of the probable future amendment to FRE 
606(b) and knowing how Oklahoma has responded to previous federal evidence rule changes 
can help assist lawmakers in amending Rule 2606(B). Unfortunately, however, Oklahoma 
has not amended either evidence rule, further justifying the need to update the state’s 
evidence code in addition to Rule 2606(B). Though, it should be noted that Oklahoma 
accounts for a notice-and-demand requirement, similar to the one in FRE 803(10)(B), 
elsewhere in its statutes. See 22 OKLA. STAT. § 751 (Supp. 2013); see also Randolph v. State, 
2010 OK CR 2, ¶ 3, 231 P.3d 672, 684 (Lumpkin, J., specially concurring) (“[A]t least 
implicitly, the U.S. Supreme Court confirmed that the type of notice/demand procedure set 
out in 22 O.S.Supp.2004, § 751(A)(3) meets constitutional muster, even in a trial setting.”). 
 227. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT rr. 1.1, 1.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
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such as Peña-Rodriguez. So, practically speaking, judges and litigators have 
the tools necessary to navigate a Peña-Rodriguez-like situation. 
Nevertheless, the main reason for codifying the Federal Rules of 
Evidence was to promote accessibility.228 In theory, “[t]he Rules can be 
printed in a small book easily carried to court, quickly perused and readily 
understandable.”229 But Rule 2606(B) and its federal counterpart are now 
incomplete, and maintaining an incomplete rule perpetuates an 
unconstitutional trap for the unwary—especially for Oklahoma’s 
overworked and underpaid public defenders.230 This risk alone should 
warrant correction.231  
Prior to the codification of the Federal Rules of Evidence, judges and 
practitioners also had the necessary tools at their disposal—albeit, sprinkled 
among thousands of cases over a century of jurisprudence. However, the 
Supreme Court and lawmakers recognized the need for a uniform and 
universal set of evidence rules and, accordingly, codified and published the 
federal evidence code. Those same policy concerns that motivated the 
codification of the Federal Rules of Evidence—namely, fairness and 
accuracy—still exist today, beckoning for resolution. 
B. First Alternative: Codifying Peña-Rodriguez 
One simple way to produce constitutionally fair verdicts is to amend 
Rule 2606(B), according to the holding in Peña-Rodriguez. In effect, the 
racial-bias exception would update the rule to conform to the current no-
impeachment rule jurisprudence and provide clarity to parties. Because 
Oklahoma did not follow the Advisory Committee in restyling the evidence 
rules into a bullet-point format, the racial-bias exception should be added as 
                                                                                                                 
 228. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK & LIESA L. RICHTER, EVIDENCE 
UNDER THE RULES: TEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS 2 (9th ed. 2019). 
 229. Id. 
 230. See sources cited supra notes 184–85 and accompanying text. 
 231. Though, it should be noted that an amendment may not be required since Pena-
Rodriguez invoked the Sixth Amendment and now applies to all criminal trials. See Adv. 
Comm. Spring 2017 Meeting, supra note 211, at 277 (“It surely can be argued that no 
amendment to Rule 606(b) is necessary in response to Pena-Rodriguez. No amendment is 
needed to remove the Rule 606(b) bar on testimony about racist statements during 
deliberation. The Sixth Amendment has already removed that bar.”). That being said, the 
perpetuation of an incomplete evidence rule, which may produce potentially unconstitutional 
results, impedes the administration of justice. See supra text accompanying notes 181–84. 
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Section C to Rule 2606.232 Under this alternative, the exception should read 
as follows: 
C. Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a 
juror may testify about whether one or more jurors made a clear 
statement indicating that the juror or jurors relied on racial 
stereotypes or animus to convict a defendant in a criminal 
case.233 
The benefit of this proposal is clear: Rule 2606 would render a complete 
picture of the no-impeachment rule and would resolve any unconstitutional 
misapplications of the rule as currently written.234 This alternative may be 
an attractive option, especially for more conservative states like Oklahoma, 
because the amended verbiage aligns the rule with current law without 
expanding the exception or anticipating what the law might become. On the 
other hand, the drawback to this proposal is that the holding of Peña-
Rodriguez is prone to expansion and may soon encapsulate other forms of 
discrimination.235 Therefore, amending the rule now may prove futile if the 
law changes in a few years. But, because that rationale perpetuates a state 
of uncertainty and deficiency, change remains necessary. 
For Oklahoma, the advantages of this alternative outweigh its 
disadvantages. Rule 2606 could develop alongside Supreme Court 
precedent while diligently maintaining Oklahoma’s evidence code. 
Furthermore, Rule 2606 would preserve the interpretation advanced by the 
Supreme Court without unintentionally incorporating future developments. 
In essence, by adopting this alternative, Oklahoma would accomplish only 
what is needed and nothing more. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 232. Whereas, an amendment to FRE 606(b) would likely be added as a fourth 
exception—subsection (D)—to FRE 606(b)(2). See Adv. Comm. Spring 2017 Meeting, 
supra note 211, at 278; cf. id. at 283 (creating a slightly different composition of the FRE 
606(b) exceptions when creating a general constitutional protection exception). 
 233. This proposed amendment aligns with the current, non-bullet-point format of Rule 
2606 by adding a section (C) that mirrors the holding in Peña-Rodriguez. See Peña-
Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 869 (2017); cf. Adv. Comm. Spring 2017 Meeting, 
supra note 211, at 278 (adding the new racial-bias exception according to FRE 606(b)’s 
format). 
 234. The ambiguity in applying the racial-bias exception, however, still remains due to 
the lack of guidance from the Supreme Court and the significant discretion imposed on trial 
courts. See supra text accompanying notes 171–80. 
 235. See sources cited supra notes 206–07. 
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C. Second Alternative: Expanding Beyond Peña-Rodriguez 
When contemplating how to modify FRE 606(b) and comparable state 
statutes, the prevailing refrain among prognosticators is that Peña-
Rodriguez is primed for expansion.236 In other words, Peña-Rodriguez is 
really an equal protection case,237 and, given time, courts will expand the 
rule to civil cases and other forms of discrimination or bias. In recognition 
of this potential for expansion, states may favor adopting exceptions with 
room to grow—thereby eliminating the need to amend their no-
impeachment rules should the Supreme Court later expand Peña-Rodriguez. 
However, lawmakers who choose this path must confront a crucial question 
in the to-expand-or-not-to-expand debate: where should the line be drawn? 
At one end of the exception spectrum exists a simple racial-bias 
exception, similar to the one discussed in the preceding section. At the other 
end of that spectrum is the Iowa rule. At its initial, post-Peña-Rodriguez 
meeting, the Advisory Committee considered two proposals aimed at 
creating a broad exception to FRE 606(b); however, despite several 
suggested amendments, the Committee only produced one fully formed 
amendment—a generic constitutional safeguard.238 Modified to conform 
with Oklahoma’s current Rule 2606 format, Section (C) would read:  
C. Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a 
juror may testify if excluding that juror’s testimony would 
violate a party’s constitutional rights.239 
This alternative would ensure compliance with constitutional rights and 
obviate the need for further amendments.240 Additionally, this new 
                                                                                                                 
 236. See sources cited supra notes 206–07. 
 237. See Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 883 (2017) (Alito, J., dissenting) 
(“Recasting this as an equal protection case would not provide a ground for limiting the 
holding to cases involving racial bias.”); Gonzalez, supra note 190, at 405 (“The heart of 
both Peña-Rodriguez and Batson decisions is really an equal protection concern, although 
Peña-Rodriguez is framed in the context of the Sixth Amendment . . . .”); Leading Cases, 
Sixth Amendment—No-Impeachment Rule—Racially Biased Statements in Jury 
Deliberations—Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 131 HARV. L. REV. 273, 279 (2017) (“Rather 
than limiting himself to the discrete body of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, Justice 
Kennedy viewed Peña-Rodriguez’s Sixth Amendment claim as opening up the full panoply 
of constitutional values, engendering an analysis replete with equal protection references.”). 
 238. See Adv. Comm. Spring 2017 Meeting, supra note 211, at 278–83 (providing four 
possible amendments but not providing explicit examples of how the third proposal would 
be codified). 
 239. See id. at 283. 
 240. See id.  
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exception would function as a “heads up” of additional constitutional 
protections for unwary practitioners. On the other hand, some may interpret 
such an exception as greatly expanding the rule created in Peña-Rodriguez, 
leaving the rule at the mercy of the ever-developing area of constitutional 
law. Because some areas of constitutional law, especially those involving 
individual rights, remain nebulous until the Supreme Court weighs in, 
circuit courts split and develop their own case law.241 The Advisory 
Committee worried about such ramifications and discussed adding a 
qualifier to “a party’s constitutional rights.”242 Under this derivative 
version, a juror may testify when “excluding the testimony would violate 
clearly established constitutional law as determined by the Supreme Court 
of the United States.”243 After some discussion, the Advisory Committee 
ultimately rejected this idea because it would handicap lower courts in their 
legitimate, independent efforts to discern constitutional imperatives.244 
Though the Committee decided that the generic constitutional exception is 
the better alternative, it has yet to modify FRE 606(b)—thus prolonging the 
waiting game.245 
For Oklahoma, this option may go a step too far; a more measured 
amendment is likely more palatable given the state’s generally conservative 
approach to rulemaking. That being said, at the heart of Peña-Rodriguez 
lies the primary aim of ensuring that criminal defendants receive their 
constitutionally mandated right to a fair trial. Though the Supreme Court 
couched its holding in narrow terms to address the unique and pernicious 
nature of racism in the justice system, reason suggests that other forms of 
bias and animus also might infringe upon one’s Sixth Amendment right. 
                                                                                                                 
 241. Recently, for example, the Supreme Court was expected to provide a resolution on 
the intersectional conflict of religious freedoms and LGBT rights in the case Masterpiece 
Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission. See, e.g., Klint W. Alexander, The 
Masterpiece Cakeshop Decision and the Clash Between Nondiscrimination and Religious 
Freedom, 71 OKLA. L. REV. 1069, 1069–70 (2019) (“The expectation among legal scholars 
was that this case would provide important guidance concerning the uneven recognition of 
LGBT rights under federal and state antidiscrimination laws and the role of religious liberty 
and free expression in this calculus.”). Somewhat unexpectedly, however, the Court decided 
the case on very narrow procedural grounds. See id. at 1101–02; see also Leslie Kendrick & 
Micah Schwartzman, The Etiquette of Animus, 132 HARV. L. REV. 133, 133 (2018) (“Rather 
than sorting out the principles for determining whether religious liberty authorizes 
discrimination against gays and lesbians in the marketplace, the Court focused on whether 
state officials treated religious objections with the proper respect and consideration.”). 
 242. See Adv. Comm. Fall 2018 Meeting, supra note 218, at 45–46. 
 243. Id. 
 244. See id. at 46. 
 245. Id. at 47. 
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Recognizing this reality and aspiring to rectify such injustice is a worthy 
objective. But is a state like Oklahoma ready to take a leap when it 
normally takes a step?246  
D. Oklahoma Should Lead the Way by Creating a Constitutional Exception 
to Its Evidence Rule 2606 
Along with a majority of states without racial-bias exceptions, Oklahoma 
finds itself in a precarious position. The first question Oklahoma lawmakers 
must answer is whether to amend its evidence rule now or wait for case law 
to develop—or, even, whether to wait for the Advisory Committee to create 
the exemplar for states to adopt? The answer to that question should, 
instinctively, be a “yes” to updating Rule 2606 to align with the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Peña-Rodriguez. As Section V.A addressed, 
perpetuating an outdated evidence rule obscures the truth and hinders the 
administration of justice in cases involving overt racial bias in the jury 
room. A simple amendment to Oklahoma’s Rule 2606 that incorporates the 
Peña-Rodriguez holding would fix the current discrepancy and put criminal 
defense lawyers on notice of additional constitutional protections.  
But, as Section V.B emphasized, Peña-Rodriguez is primed for 
expansion. How, when, and to what extent will its holding be expanded are 
questions best left for another day, but most scholars forecast that Peña-
Rodriguez will be expanded to include other suspect classifications of 
discrimination and will eventually be applied in civil cases. Therefore, the 
second question Oklahoma lawmakers must answer is whether to create a 
narrow racial-bias exception or to amend the rule, with room to grow, by 
including a broad constitutional safeguard. 
Answering the second question is undoubtedly the harder task. 
Proponents of the Peña-Rodriguez decision applaud the Court’s willingness 
to protect criminal defendants’ right to a fair trial and eliminate racial bias 
and animus from the justice system.247 On the other hand, opponents fear 
                                                                                                                 
 246. See supra note 226 and accompanying text. 
 247. See, e.g., Natalie A. Spiess, Comment, Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado: A Critical, but 
Incomplete, Step in the Never-Ending War on Racial Bias, 95 DENV. L. REV. 809, 836 
(2018) (noting “the Court took an important step forward in the fight against racism when it 
ruled that the Constitution mandates an exception to the no-impeachment rule in cases of 
juror racial bias” but arguing the Court should have done more); Samuel R. Thomas, 
Comment, Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado: A Constitutional Battle of Public Policy, 53 GONZ. 
L. REV. 355, 372 (2017) (“The traditional policies and safeguards that have long balanced 
the protection of the jury with that of the defendant are not necessarily outdated, but it must 
be recognized that there is a certain class of defendants that [is] still subject to significant 
harm. . . . Thankfully, the Court has moved in favor of justice and equality under the law.”); 
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that Peña-Rodriguez has opened Pandora’s box and will, consequently, act 
as a conduit for further investigation into the deliberations of jurors.248 But 
if the critics are correct—that Pandora’s box has been opened—all is not 
lost.  
In the Greek mythological tale, Zeus created Pandora, the first woman, 
as a punishment to Prometheus for stealing fire and giving it to mortal 
men.249 The gods then bestowed upon Pandora a box that contained many 
evils, and they forbade her from ever opening the box.250 But Pandora was a 
curious being, and one day she opened the lid of the box, and numerous 
evils began spewing out into the world.251 Terrified, Pandora shut the lid 
quickly, but everything had already escaped except one thing: hope.252 “It 
was the only good the casket had held among the many evils, and it remains 
to this day mankind’s sole comfort in misfortune.”253  
The idiom “opened Pandora’s box” has come to denote an action taken 
that then creates “unexpected and unwanted problems and 
consequences.”254 If Peña-Rodriguez has indeed opened Pandora’s box, its 
                                                                                                                 
Amanda L. B. Wineman, Comment, The Invasion of Racial Bias into Jury Deliberations: 
Examining Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 41 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 211, 237 (2017) (“Peña-
Rodriguez demonstrates the Court moving forward, making strides to overcome race-based 
discrimination.”). 
 248. See Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 875 (2017) (Alito, J., dissenting) 
(“Today, with the admirable intention of providing justice for one criminal defendant, the 
Court not only pries open the door; it rules that respecting the privacy of the jury room, as 
our legal system has done for centuries, violates the Constitution.”) (emphasis added); see 
also Alisa Micu, Note, Addressing Racial Bias in the Jury System: Another Failed Attempt?, 
35 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 843, 865 (2019) (arguing that the Supreme Court has provided an 
“unworkable ruling that compromises the system more than it protects it”); Taurus Myhand, 
Note, Will the Jury System Survive the Peña-Rodriguez Exception to Rule 606(b)?: The 
Court’s Response to Racial Discrimination by a Juror Leaves the Future of the American 
Jury Trial System in Jeopardy, 23 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 103, 123 (2018) (“Another 
troubling, but likely outcome that may follow the Court’s decision in Peña-Rodriguez is 
seemingly endless litigation by unsatisfied litigants seeking to undermine the jury’s 
verdict.”). 
 249. See EDITH HAMILTON, MYTHOLOGY: TIMELESS TALES OF GODS AND HEROES 70 
(1942). This version of Pandora’s story is recited according to Hesiod, who is considered the 
“principal authority for the myths about the beginning of everything.” Id. at 63. 
 250. See id. at 70. 
 251. See id. at 70, 72. 
 252. See id. at 72. 
 253. Id. 
 254. OFF. OF ENG. LANGUAGE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, IN THE LOOP: A 
REFERENCE GUIDE TO AMERICAN ENGLISH IDIOMS 68 (1st ed. 2010), https://permanent. 
access.gpo.gov/gpo46375/PDF%20version/in_the_loop_pages.pdf, adapted from SHELLEY 
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goal is a hopeful one: to uphold criminal defendants’ right to a fair trial by 
eradicating prejudicial bias. As Justice Kennedy pronounced in his majority 
opinion, “[i]t must become the heritage of our Nation to rise above racial 
classifications that are so inconsistent with our commitment to the equal 
dignity of all persons.”255 But if the aim of Peña-Rodriguez is to promote 
the equal dignity of all persons, why should jurisdictions implicitly permit 
other forms of bias and discrimination that may be as prejudicial as racial 
bias? Over one hundred years ago, the McDonald Court admonished that 
“in the gravest and most important cases,” the exclusion of juror testimony 
may violate “the plainest principles of justice.”256 Yet, in theory, a 
defendant in Oklahoma may still be convicted because his or her religion, 
sexuality, or gender played a significant role in the jury’s decision to 
convict. This outcome amounts to a denial of justice and should be 
rectified. 
Therefore, to answer the second question posed, Oklahoma should aim 
high and add a constitutional exception to Rule 2606. This resolution 
incorporates the Peña-Rodriguez holding while recognizing the existence of 
other pernicious forms of discrimination worthy of comparable treatment. 
In adopting this approach, the state of Oklahoma would derive three 
primary benefits. First, Oklahoma citizens would receive equal dignity in 
trials because jurors would be able to testify about overt displays of bias or 
discrimination of a suspect classification in the jury room. Second, this 
amendment would warn public defenders that their clients may have some 
redress and could, ultimately, provide better representation. Finally, this 
amendment would encourage the fair administration of justice by requiring 
jurors to decide cases based on the objective facts in the record rather than 
on deep-seated biases.  
The United States is a government by the people, and juries are the 
epitome of that principle.257 But, because people are not perfect, juries are 
not perfect. Though the law permits some imperfections in the jury system 
since perfection is not possible,258 it should not condone avoidable, 
                                                                                                                 
VANCE LAFLIN, SOMETHING TO CROW ABOUT: A CONCISE COLLECTION OF AMERICAN 
ENGLISH IDIOMS FOR EVERYDAY USE (Anna Maria Malkoç & Frank Smolinski eds., U.S. 
Info. Agency 1993). 
 255. Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 867 (2017) (emphasis added). 
 256. Id. at 864 (quoting McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 269 (1915)). 
 257. Id. at 860 (“The jury is a tangible implementation of the principle that the law 
comes from the people.”).  
 258. See McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 553 (1984). 
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prejudicial imperfections. Accordingly, Oklahoma lawmakers should 
rectify the discrepancy in the evidence code created by Peña-Rodriguez. 
VII. Conclusion 
In early 2017, the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Peña-
Rodriguez v. Colorado effected a significant shift in the application of the 
no-impeachment rule. As a result, Oklahoma’s Rule 2606(B) and its federal 
counterpart have been rendered incomplete and have set a trap for the 
unwary. Oklahoma lawmakers have a great opportunity to rectify this 
discrepancy by providing a replicable model for other states to follow. At 
the very least, lawmakers should add a racial-bias exception that mirrors the 
holding language in Peña-Rodriguez. Based on the majority’s reasoning, 
however, the rule may eventually be expanded to civil cases, as well as to 
other forms of discrimination. Thus, Oklahoma should amend Rule 2606 by 
adding a constitutional exception—thereby promoting equal dignity, 
transparency, and fairness. 
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